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I. ARGUMENT 
A. THE BRIDGES DETERMINED THE NATURE OF THEIR 
IMPROVEMENTS AS PERSONAL, NOT REAL, PROPERTY. 
Channeling Claude Rains as Captain Louis Renault in Casablanca (Warner Bros. 1942), 
the Bridges feign to be "shocked, shocked" that Idaho First would regard their improvements as 
personal property. 1 Their shock comes despite the fact that they agreed with the State in their 
2014 Lease that their improvements were "Personal Property." R., p. 400. It comes despite the 
fact they paid taxes on their improvements as personal property.2 And it comes despite the fact 
that Idaho First could not obtain any interest in their leasehold through a real property 
foreclosure or otherwise, as acknowledged originally by their counsel.3 Neither the District 
Court before nor the Bridges now acknowledge the unique complexity of the situation faced by a 
lender whose defaulting borrower enjoys only a personal property interest in their improvements 





"IFB surprisingly claimed that the cottage and lease was personal property and not real 
property and therefore not subject to§ 45-1503." Joint Respondents' and Cross-Appellants' 
Brief, at p. 3. Further citations to this Brief are cited to "Respondents' Brief' by page number. 
2 See Section I.A.2. below. 
See R., p. 59 and counsel's suggestion that Idaho First set up a straw man. 
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1. Parties may choose to characterize their improvements as personal 
property, which characterization is binding. 
The Bridges appeal to "common sense and logic, long established real estate legal 
principles,"4 as well as other purported reasons to argue that a $1.6 million "cottage" just has to 
be real property. Respondents' Brief, p. 17. Contrary to this bare claim, what is actually a long-
standing real estate principle is that parties are free to characterize improvements as personal or 
real. One court stated it well: 
Houses and other improvements placed [ on land] by man may or may not be a 
part of the realty--depending upon contracts and intentions of parties thereto. 
Everyone knows that in many cases that have been before the courts men erect 
structures and even very valuable improvements on lands of another under 
contracts, agreements, and evident intentions that such improvements shall never 
be a part of the land and never become the property of the land owner. When such 
conditions arise the improvements do not become real property but remain 
personal. 
Rogers v. Fort Worth Poultry & Egg Co., 185 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. Civ. App 1944), cited in, 
Manasco v. Gilmer Boating & Fishing Club, 339 S.W.3d 828, 835 (Tex. Civ. App. 2011). The 
same contractual freedom was recognized in Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. McCornick, 32 Idaho 
462, 468, 186 P. 252, 253 (1919) ( except when intention is determined by contract or agreement, 
look to all the circumstances to impute intention). 5 
4 Leasehold interests are not straightforward real property interests. See, e.g., 
Intermountain Realty Co. v. Allen, 60 Idaho 228, 232-33, 90 P.2d 704, 705-06 (1939) (defining 
leaseholds as "chattels real" as opposed to a freehold, which is realty). 
5 Quoted in Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 9. The Bridges do not address, distinguish or 
even mention this case in their response. 
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Third parties, such as lenders, must live with the intention expressed in the parties' 
contract. In Mace v. G.E. Capital Mortg. Serv. (In re Mace), 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 2047 (U.S. 
Bankr. D. Neb. Dec. 1, 2000), for example, the Maces owned a leasehold interest in real estate 
upon which their house was located. They provided to Norwest Mortgage a promissory note and 
a deed of trust, describing the leased land. They later provided to Rosen Auto Leasing a 
promissory note and security agreement, which described the same leasehold interest. Upon 
filing a Chapter 13 petition, the bankruptcy court had to determine the nature of their interest to 
establish priorities. The Court noted first that the real estate lease documents contained specific 
language concerning the status of improvements, which made clear that all existing and future 
improvements would remain the property of the lessee. 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 2047 *5. 
Additionally, the Maces received their interest in the real estate and the house by an assignment 
of lease and a bill of sale, not a deed representing a conveyance of real estate. Id. 
The Court noted that "improvements to a leasehold interest in real estate are personal 
property if the lease documents show an intent by the parties that the improvements remain 
personalty. Id. It further noted that a lessor of real property and a lessee of real property may 
contract with regard to the status of improvements as either "fixtures" or personal property. Id. 
Accordingly, the Court found that Rosen Auto Leasing had priority over the competing interest 
ofNorwest Mortgage. Id. 
Similarly, in Pacific Metal Co. v. Northwestern Bank, 667 P.2d 958 (Mont. 1983), 
Burlington Northern leased a portion of its right-of-way in Helena to Carson Company, allowing 
Carson to construct, maintain and operate a warehouse and office. Paragraph 14 of the lease 
,., - .) -
required Carson to remove from the leased premises, prior to the date of termination of the lease, 
all structures not belonging to the lessor and to restore the premises to substantially their former 
state. Carson constructed a 180' by 55' warehouse and office, which was affixed to the land by a 
cement foundation and abutted by cement loading docks. 667 P.2d at 959. 
Northwestern Bank advanced funds to Carson and secured its loans with a series of 
security agreements and perfected by filing a series of financing statements. Additionally, 
Carson, Burlington Northern and Northwestern Bank entered into a collateral security agreement 
by which Burlington Northern consented to an assignment of the lease to Northwestern Bank 
should the improvements be taken over by the Bank in collection proceedings against Carson. 
667 P.2d at 960. 
Later, Pacific Metal obtained a judgment against Carson, which became a judgment lien 
upon all real property held by Carson. Carson transferred its interest in the leased property and 
building to Northwestern Bank by a bill of sale. Pacific Metal filed a declaratory judgment 
action against the Bank seeking a judgment that the Carson warehouse was real property and that 
the Bank did not have a security interest. Despite Montana fixture statutes suggesting that 
buildings resting upon land are fixtures, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court 
determination that the building was personal property. 667 P.2d at 960. The Court stated that, 
despite the fixture statutes, it "is possible for parties to agree that a building is personal property 
even though it is attached to and resting upon land." Id. (further citation omitted). 
The Court also rejected Pacific Metal's argument that the lease gave Carson only a 
theoretical or conditional right of removal of the improvements, given the character of the 
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structure and the manner in which it was affixed to the land. Reviewing the three-prong test 
common to fixture analysis,6 the Court noted that, of the three prongs, "the intent of the parties 
has the most weight and is the controlling factor." 667 P.2d at 971. The Court then explained: 
In landlord-tenant situations, whether an improvement is personal property or part 
of the realty is to be determined by the intention of the parties, as expressed in the 
lease. Rights between a landlord and tenant with respect to fixtures may be 
modified, restricted or extended by agreement. 36A C.J.S. Fixtures§ 15(a) 
(1961). 
Id. (emphasis added). The Court then noted that the lease's characterization of the improvements 
as personalty demonstrated the requisite intent. Moreover, the removal provision also evidenced 
the parties' agreement that the warehouse was not to be considered as permanently affixed to the 
lessor's realty. Id. Thus, despite the existence of concrete foundation, the size of the structure, 
the expense of the improvements, the Court focused on the intent of the parties as expressed in 
their lease agreement. 
Here, the Bridges and the State agreed that "all buildings, structures, additions or 
developments belonging to LESSEE that have been erected upon, affixed or attached to, the 
Leased Premises" would be deemed "Personal Property." R., p. 400. Both the 2014 Lease and 
the original Assigned Lease stated that, upon default, the State could remove or require the 
Bridges to remove any personal property improvements. R., pp. 408; 98. Similar language 
existed upon any abandonment. R., pp. 41 O; 98. Upon expiration of a lease, the State had the 
6 The same three part-test set forth in Spencer v. Jameson, 147 Idaho 497, 502, 211 P.3d 
106, 111 (2009). 
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right to require the Bridges to remove all approved improvements on the premises and to restore 
them as its natural condition. R., pp. 409; 98. 
The District Court was wrong to dismiss these contractual provisions blithely away as 
"theoretical" or "remote." R., p. 781. It was not for the District Court to speculate as to the 
probability of future events, especially given the multitude of situations that could arise in which 
the State would decide to exercise these contractual powers. Instead, the focus should have 
remained on the intention of the parties as expressed in the lease, the most important of the three-
prong text for fixtures. Simply put, the Bridges could not have intended their improvements to 
become a permanent fixture when the State forbade that intention through the plain language of 
the lease. Bridges are trying to call both heads and tails on the same coin flip. They could not 
have the intention to make their improvements a permanent accession to the realty when their 
state lease language says they are not permanent and we can require removal. 
Accordingly, under this authority the State and the Bridges determined the character of 
the improvements as personal property. The District Court erred in overriding their 
characterization as evidenced in the lease agreements. The parties' characterization in the 
agreements is hardly "insignificant," as the District Court termed it. R., p. 780. Rather, it is the 
clear expression of their intent as to the nature of the improvements as personal property. As a 
matter of law, only one reasonable conclusion may be drawn from this lease language - that the 
improvements remained personal property and did not constitute a fixture. 
-6-
As to this personal property, Idaho First was not obligated to follow the collateral-first 
dictate of I.C. § 45-1503(1) nor the time limitation for a deficiency action set forth in I.C. § 45-
1512. Summary judgment in favor of the Bridges must be reversed. 
2. Even if the language of the lease agreements was not determinative, 
the totality of circumstances indicates the improvements were 
intended to remain personal property. 
The Bridges chide Idaho First for not addressing the nine factors for consideration of 
intent as to fixture versus personal property approved in Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. 
Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S., 159 Idaho 679,692,365 P.3d 1033, 1046 (2016). 
Respondents' Brief, pp. 18-19. As noted in Section A.I, above, examination of these factors is 
unnecessary where only one reasonable conclusion may be drawn from the parties' agreement as 
to the nature of improvements. In Liberty Bankers, there is no indication of an agreement 
explicitly characterizing the improvements at issue - different components of a boat marina. 
Even if the Bridges lease agreement with the State were not determinative, however, 
examination of the nine factors does not support the District Court's conclusion that the Bridges 
were entitled to summary judgment. 
The Bridges claim that "the nine factors all weigh in favor of showing objective intent to 
affix the Cottage" and that "each of the Liberty Bankers objective factors is addressed by the 
undisputed evidence." Respondents Brief, pp. 18-19. Such is simply not the case. The nine 
factors are: 
(1) the nature of the article; (2) the manner of annexation to the land; (3) the 
injury to the land, if any, by its removal; ( 4) the completeness with which the 
chattel is integrated with the use to which the land is being put; (5) the relation 
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which the annexer has with the land such as licensee, tenant at will or for years or 
for life or fee owner [sic]; (6) the relation which the annexer has with the chattel 
such as owner, bailee or converter; (7) the local custom respecting treating such 
chattel as personal property or a fixture; (8) the time, place and degree of social, 
economic and cultural development, ( e.g., a luxury in one generation is a 
necessity in another ... ); and (9) all other relevant facts surrounding the 
annexation. 
159 Idaho at 692, 365 P .3d at 1046 ( citations omitted). 
The Bridges claim in their summary table that under factor (3) regarding any injury to the 
land by removal of the improvement, that "there is no contingency for removal and therefore 
likely significant damage, if not complete destruction." As the Court is well aware, structures 
are regularly removed or demolished without "significant damage, if not complete destruction" 
of the underlying land. Indeed, state endowment land surrounding Payette Lake retains its 
aesthetic and recreational value with or without the Bridges' improvement. 
Factor (5)'s focus on the "relation which the annexer has with the land" brings the lease 
agreement back into view. The Bridges' status as lessees with only very limited rights in their 
improvements in the event of default, abandonment or non-renewal suggests they could not 
intend a permanent fixture, because their lessor would not allow it. Similarly, under factor (6) 
their relation with their chattel is limited under these same lease terms. 
Under factor (7) as to local custom, it is clear that improvements on State lease land are 
treated as personal property, not fixtures. For instance, other state law taxes the improvements as 
personal, rather than real, property. J.C. § 63-602A exempts, inter alia, property belonging to 
the State of Idaho from taxation. J.C. § 63-309(1 )( indicates that all taxable improvements on 
state land or other exempt land "shall be assessed and taxed as personal property"). 
- 8 - ' 
Thus, examination of these factors does not support the District Court's conclusion that 
the McCall collateral was real property. 
3. The loan documents and security agreements between the Bridges and 
Idaho First are not determinative. 
At Section V .B.1. b. of Respondents' Brief, the Bridges echo the District Court's puzzling 
conclusion that, although the characterization in the 2014 Lease Agreement that their 
improvements remain Personal Property is "insignificant," the fact that Idaho First utilized a 
Deed of Trust document in the loan transaction is somehow determinative. The simple fact is that 
Idaho First utilized documents, as it would with all such transactions, that included language 
both as to real and/or personal property, so that regardless of the outcome of any potential legal 
battle over the nature of collateral, it was secure. In addition to the language cited by the 
Bridges, the Deed of Trust "grants to Lender a Uniform Commercial Code security interest in the 
Personal Property and Rents." The Deed of Trust clearly provides that any personal property is 
also pledged to secure all indebtedness. The Deed of Trust, 
"INCLUDING THE ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AND THE SECURITY 
INTEREST IN THE RENTS AND PERSONAL PROPERTY, IS GIVEN TO 
SECURE (A) PAYMENT OF THE INDEBTEDNESS AND (B) 
PERFORMANCE OF ANY AND ALL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 
NOTE AND THE RELATED DOCUMENTS . ... 
R., p. 386 (emphasis in original). 
Moreover, under "SECURITY AGREEMENT; FINANCING STATEMENTS," the 
following provisions appear: 
Security Agreement. This instrument shall constitute a Security Agreement to 
the extent that any of the Property constitutes fixtures, and Lender shall have all 
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of the rights of a secured party under the Uniform Commercial Code as amended 
from time to time. 
Security Interest. Upon request by Lender, Grantor shall take whatever action is 
requested by Lender to perfect and continue Lender's security interest in the 
Personal Property ... Lender may, at any time and without further authorization 
from Grantor, file executed counterparts, copies or reproductions of this Deed of 
Trust as a financing statement. .. 
While this language may not track the exact distinctions at issue now regarding "fixtures" as real 
property versus improvements as personal property, it is clear that the instrument pledged all 
property regardless of characterization. The fact that a Deed of Trust form is utilized and 
references to buildings as real property are included does not alter the legal nature of the 
improvements at issue. 
What neither the District Court nor the Bridges address is the question of how Idaho First 
was to conduct a real property foreclosure when it could obtain no legal rights in the leasehold, 
the ground upon which the improvements sat. According to Idaho law, Idaho First could not 
hold the property, as the Bridges' counsel originally conceded. Thus, the District Court and the 
Bridges conclude that they intended a legal impossibility - that Idaho First would be required to 
follow real property foreclosure requirements when it could not. Once it foreclosed, it could not 
possess the improvements it had obtained through foreclosure. 7 
Accordingly, Idaho First was not required to resort to collateral first before seeking 
collection from the Bridges nor the follow the time limitation for a deficiency action set forth in 
7 As noted previously, the Bridges' counsel understood this very well, suggesting 
originally that Idaho First utilize a straw man "entity" to take assignment of the lease, a 
subterfuge that doubtless would have violated IDAPA 20.03.13.02. See, R., p. 59. 
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LC.§ 45-1512. Summary judgment in favor of the Bridges must be reversed and Idaho First's 
deficiency claim should be allowed to proceed before the District Court. 
B. EVEN IF IDAHO FIRST WERE REQUIRED TO FOLLOW LC.§ 45-1512, 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 
ALLOWING RELATION BACK OF THE DEFICIENCY CLAIM. 
1. The Bridges had notice of Idaho First's claims and cannot be 
prejudiced by an amendment. 
As noted previously, the District Court erroneously concluded that Idaho First was 
required to follow Idaho's collateral-first rule and time limitation for seeking a deficiency under 
real property law. Even if, somehow, Idaho First were obligated to follow these statutes as if the 
Bridges improvements were not personal property, it is absurd to suggest that its deficiency 
claim does not arise from the same transaction as its original collection action. The District 
Court conceded, as it had to, that "[t]o be sure, the original and first amended complaints 
involved attempts to collect on the same loan involved in the section 45-1512 claim." R., p. 776. 
Yet, the District Court then went on to insist on a type of code pleading, noting that the "prior 
complaints did not mention the deed-of-trust collateral." Id. (emphasis in original). Whether 
mentioned or not, as could be predicted, the Bridges immediately raised the existence of the 
Deed of Trust in a motion to dismiss. R., p. 375. All of the substantive issues regarding 
foreclosure were engaged from the beginning. The only change was that the property was sold, 
resulting in a deficiency. Rule 15(d) is designed for exactly these circumstances. The Bridges 
can hardly claim unfair surprise or prejudice when the resulting amount they owe to Idaho First 
is now less than it was prior to the sale. 
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2. The District Court abused its discretion in concluding that it was 
inequitable to allow a deficiency claim because of a purported failure 
to follow the collateral-first rule of I.C. § 45-1503(1 ). 
Noting that Rule 15( c) has its roots in the former federal equity practice, the District 
Court then felt it could sideline the long-standing tests under Rule 15( c) and 15( d)8 in favor of its 
own sense of equity. R., p. 778. And it seemed to the Court "entirely inequitable" for Idaho 
First's deficiency claim to relate back, because it had not followed I.C. § 45-1503(1). Just what 
prejudice was caused by the supposed failure to follow the collateral-first rule is unclear, 
however. As a result ofldaho First's original collection suit against the Bridges, experienced 
lawyers9 with experienced counsel, the suit immediately became a de facto declaratory judgment 
action with the Court determining whether it believed the collateral to constitute personal or real 
property. Luckily for the Bridges, a sale intervened during the case to relieve them of a large 
share of their indebtedness. 
This was no garden-variety foreclosure proceeding where the lender, clearly having real 
property collateral, willy-nilly ignored the collateral-first requirement of§ 45-1503(1 ). Rather, 
this was an action arising in a nether world where the legal nature of the collateral was in serious 
doubt. To suggest that Idaho First obtained any unfair or inequitable advantage in this 
proceeding is demonstrably false. The District Court voiced concern that any lender might avoid 
the time-for-filing requirement ofl.C. § 45-1512 by filing first a collection action, then seeking 
8 Idaho First does not repeat a discussion of these tests here, but incorporates its prior 
discussion at Section IV.B of Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 16-35. 
R., p. 544, 12. 
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an amendment after the three-month period required, as discussed in Badger v. Eighth Judicial 
District Court, 373 P.3d 89, 94-5 (Nev. 2016). In a typical situation, that kind of amendment 
could well prejudice debtors. Here, however, where there was a genuine and difficult issue as to 
the legal nature of the collateral, the District Court was wrong to compare the situations. The 
Bridges devote considerable time to this argument, but the plain fact is that the situation here is 
unique because of the vagaries of state endowment land leases. 
3. I.C. § 45-1512 is not a statute of repose. 
In their argument advancing the notion that the three-month limitation set forth in § 45-
1512 is a statute of repose, rather than a statute of limitation, the Bridges reverse the distinction 
between statutes of repose and of limitation. Respondents' Brief, p. 34. Statutes of limitation 
are shorter, such as suing upon notice of a defective product. Statutes of repose are longer, 
acting as bars to stale claims regardless of notice. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
explained the distinction: 
The focus of a statute of repose is entirely different from the focus of a statute of 
limitations. The latter bars a plaintiff from proceeding because he has slept on his 
rights, or otherwise been inattentive. Therefore, it is manifestly unjust to tell 
somebody that he has X years to file an action, and then shorten the time in 
midstream. However, a statute of repose proceeds on the basis that it is unfair to 
make somebody defend an action long after something was done or some product 
was sold. It declares that nobody should be liable at all after a certain amount of 
time has passed, and that it is unjust to allow an action to proceed after that. In 
this case, for example, there was an attempt to sue the manufacturer for the 
allegedly defective design of a part of an aircraft that had been in service for some 
23 years after it was first sold. While an injured party might feel aggrieved by the 
fact that no action can be brought, repose is a choice that the legislature is free to 
make. 
Lyon v. Agusta SP.A., 252 F.3d 1078, 1086 (91h Cir. 2001). 
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Here, I.C. § 45-1512 acts just like a statute of limitation. Once there is a sale under a 
deed of trust, there is a time period in which to seek a remaining deficiency. The debt is not 
extinguished, as it would be pursuant to an actual statute of repose. This Court recently stated in 
a similar context: 
However, the running of the statute of limitations does not extinguish the debt. 
Joseph v. Darrar, 93 Idaho 762,766,472 P.2d 328, 332 (1970). 'Statutes of 
limitations are limitations on a party's right to bring an action. A statute of 
limitations does not apply (1) to defenses where no affirmative relief is sought, or 
(2) to self-help set-offs and pledges.' 
Sallaz v. Rice, 384 P.3d 987, 992-93, 91 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 261 (2016), quoting, 
Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 114 Idaho 680,683, 760 P.2d 19, 22 (1988). 
Accordingly, §45-1512 is not a statute ofrepose and any purported bar to relation back 
under Rule 15( d) or ( c) does not exist. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, as well as those first stated in Appellant's Opening Brief, 
the District Court's entry of summary judgment must be reversed and this case remanded for 
further proceedings. 
Dated this 191h day of September, 2017. 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & ~RK, L\ 
) 
Daniel E. Williams 
Attorneys for Appellant/Cross-Respondent, Idaho 
First Bank 
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